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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE JENCKS RULE'S APPLICATION TO ADVERSARY
ADJUDICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
By applying Jencks v. United States' to proceedings of federal agencies,
the courts have added a new dimension of evidentiary fair play to administra-
tive law. Jencks itself was a criminal case,2 which granted the defendant's
request to inspect certain FBI reports which prosecution witnesses had made
two years before the trial. 3 Apparently, the defendant wished this information
for purposes of discovery and possible cross-examination. The Supreme Court
formulated a general rule of evidence-the defendant is entitled to all prior
statements of the witness in the prosecution's possession which concern the
same events and activities as their testimony.4 "Justice," the Court said,
"requires no less." 5 The Court also reiterated the doctrine that the prosecution
could not assert the governmental privilege for state secrets in order to with-
1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). For examples of both legal and nonlegal discussion en-
gendered by this case see Comment, 67 YAIE L.J. 674 (1958) ; Keffe, Jincks and Jencks,
7 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 91 (1958); Note, 21 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1959); 11 INoax To LEGAL
PMnIODIcAr.s 728 (1958) (collecting articles); Time, June 17, 1957, p. 19; N.Y. Times,
June 4, 1957, p. 1, col. 6; id., Aug. 18, 1957, § 4, p. 10, col. 1 (cartoon).
2. Jencks was accused of filing false noncommunist affidavits with the NLRB. Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(h) requires each labor union officer
to file an affidavit stating that he is not a member of, or affiliated with, the Communist
Party. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952). Jencks was
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952), which makes it a felony to give false
information to the Government. 353 U.S. at 658-59.
3. 353 U.S. at 659. These witnesses were both undercover agents of the FBI. After
the Supreme -Court ordered a new trial, the Government abandoned its prosecution, since
one agent was no longer available as a witness. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1953, p. 15,
cols. 1-5. As to the relationship between the importance of the witness' testimony and
the Supreme Court decision, see note 59 infra.
4. 353 U.S. at 668. The Fifth Circuit had held that production could only be
obtained if the defendant established variance between the contents of the witness'
testimony and his previous statements. See Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 540, 552
(5th Cir. 1955) ; Comment, 67 YArx L.J. 674, 677 n.13 (1958) (collecting similar hold-
ings). In reversing, the Supreme Court expressly disclaimed any need for a showing
of inconsistency. Such a requirement, the Court reasoned, would often result in deny-
ing the defense relevant and material evidence. Unless 'the witness actually admitted an
inconsistency, the accused would be unable to know or discover the conflict without
inspecting the reports. The defendant merely had to show that the material sought was
related to the witness' testimony. 353 U.S. at 666-68.
The Court decided the case on a common law basis, and apparently did not regard
its conclusion as dictated by the constitutional guaranty of "confrontation" by prosecu-
tion witnesses. See U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
5. See 353 U.S. at 669.
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hold such statements. Under this rationale, as developed by the Second
Circuit, the initiation of a criminal prosecution constitutes automatic waiver
of the Government's privilege if the requested material is relevant to the
accused's defense.6 Finally, the Court ruled that when the prosecution refuses
to comply with a court order to submit the witness' statements, the indictment
must be dismissed." Although the dismissal's effect was not discussed, it was
6. 353 U.S. at 670-71. The Court cited United States v. Beekman, 155 F2d 580
(2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (dictum).
In the courts below the Government did not assert that the reports [requested
in the Jencks case] were privileged against disclosure on grounds of national
security, confidential character of the reports, public interest or otherwise. In its
brief in this Court, however, the Government argues that, absent a showing of
contradiction, "[tfhe rule urged by petitioner ... disregards the legitimate interest
that each party ... has in safeguarding the privacy of its files, particularly where
the documents in question were obtained in confidence. Production of such docu-
ments, even to a court, should not be compelled in the absence of a preliminary
showing by the party making the request."
353 U.S. at 669-70. The Court accepted this as an argument of governmental privilege
and invoked the waiver doctrine. 353 U.S. at 670-71. See notes 19, 39 hnfra.
7. 353 U.S. at 672. The Court was referring to government noncompliance on the
grounds that the requested statements contained privileged matter. But it is evident,
however, that the Court intended the same sanction to apply to governmental noncom-
pliance when no claim of privilege was made. See Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 697
(1958) ; Schwartz, Jencks-An Unveiling Pattern of Expanding Federal Crinminal Dis-
covery, 3 So. TEx. L.J. 111, 138 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; 57 MIca. L.
REv. 420, 421 (1.959). No claim of privilege was made by the Government in the Second
Circuit cases upon which Jencks relied, and the court in those cases held that government
refusal to submit documents pursuant to court order would occasion dismissal of the
indictment. See United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States
v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946).
In announcing its ruling on the proper disposition of the case, the Court merely stated
that ". . . the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground
of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection
and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its possession of govern-
ment witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial." 353 U.S. at 672.
(Emphasis added.)
"Dismissal" is ambiguous in that it can be used to indicate either dismissal with or
without prejudice. BLAcK, LAw DIcrIoNARY 555-56 (4th ed. 1951); Dismissal, 12A
WoRDs & PHRASES 440-42 (1954).
FED. R. CRIf. P. 48(a), the federal adaptation of the common-law nolle prosequi, states:
"The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of the court file a
dismissal of an indictment . . . and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a
dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant." See
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule 48(a), in 18 U.S.C. following § 3771 (1952). A
dismissal under this statute permits the Government to reinstate the prosecution with the
original indictment. United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
666 (1942) ; District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
658 (1942). However, it is clear that in Jencks the Supreme Court meant "dismissal" to
mean of the indictment, not "Rule 48(a) dismissal." Thus, the Court quoted its decision
in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), that ". . . the Government can invoke
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apparently intended to be with prejudice, thus barring further prosecution. A
reindictment would presumably place the defendant in double jeopardy.$ As
its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free." 353 U.S. at
670-71.
In United States v. Grayson, 166 F2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948), a situation similar
to Jencks, the court declared that if the Government refused to allow the defendant access
to documents, it would have to "let the offences go unpunished." This was the apparent
meaning in Jencks. See note 8 infra.
It has been stated that the language of the decision might be limited to cases, like
Jcncks, where the testimony of the witnesses involved was of crucial importance, as the
Court did not intend the sanction of dismissal to be automatically applied to all cases.
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 697 n.84 (1958). See note 59 infra.
8. The general rule is that a defendant is placed in jeopardy once "... he is
regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to
try him. . . ." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904); see 15 Amt. JUR.
Crininal Law § 369 (1938) (collecting cases). The dismissal in Jenwks would come
after the jury had been impaneled and therefore would seem to fit within the general rule.
However, in interpreting the rule, the Supreme Court has declared that the double-
jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment ". . . does not mean that every time a
defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the
trial fails to end in a final judgment." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949). And
it is a point of long standing that the constitutional safeguard contemplated that federal
criminal courts have ". . . the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict,
whenever . . . , taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." United
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (quoted with approval in Wade v.
Hunter, supra at 690). The rationale of this rule is that "the discharge of a jury in a
criminal case, on the ground of a necessity which could neither be foreseen nor controlled,
imposes no hardship on the defendant of which he has a right to complain. He, alike
with the government, must submit to the law of necessity, which, of all other laws, is
the most inexorable." United States v. Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cas. 1067, 1068 (No. 16279)
(C.C.D. Ill. 1840) (quoted in United States v. Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1955)). Accordingly, such necessity has been found where the jury could
not agree on a verdict, Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892), or where a juror
appeared insane, United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. 207 (No. 15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823), or was ill, United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 584 (1941). It seems that when the Government refuses to comply with a court's
order to produce witnesses' statements for the benefit of the defendant, such refusal is
not such an occurrence "which could neither be foreseen nor controlled [and] imposes
no hardship on the defendant of which he has a right to complain." United States v.
Shoemaker, supra at 1068. Nor is the Government bound by necessity to refuse. Further-
more, Congress interpreted the dismissal in Tencks to mean an end to the prosecution.
It considered the Court's sanction drastic. Schwartz 138. Its legislative purpose was
modification of the decision. Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 697 (1958). If Congress
did not think the defendant would be free from a second prosecution, it would not have
enacted legislation permitting a mistrial to be declared. See note 12 infra. Such action
would then be nothing more than codification of the Court's decision. Cf. United States
v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948), discussed note 7 supra.
Reindictment is permitted by federal statute, but only to cure defects in the original
indictment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288, 3289 (1952).
While indictment after dismissal for not complying with the Jencks Rule would be
double jeopardy, an appeal taken from such dismissal might not be. Comment, 67 YALE
L.J. 674, 698 n.89 (1958) ; cf. Steffen, Concerning Double Jeopardy and the New Rules,
7 FEr. B.J. 86, 89-91 (1945). But cf. Schwartz 138-39.
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a result of popular disapproval of the decision,9 Congress hastily passed modi-
fying legislation.' 0 But the statute affirms the case's basic principle--"the
Jencks Rule"-by permitting the defendant to demand production of any
prior statement of a witness which relates to his testimony.'1 By negative
inference, the proposition that institution of a criminal suit constitutes waiver
of any governmental privilege was also accepted. Under the act's language,
only lack of relevancy would make a court's denial of an inspection request
justifiable. 12 The sanction for governmental refusal to submit relevant pretrial
statements was limited, however, to striking the witness' testimony, or if
"the interests of justice require," to declaring a mistrial,'3 which would not
prevent new proceedings.
Although neither the Jencks case nor its legislative aftermath referred to
administrative actions, 14 two recent circuit court decisions have applied the
Jencks Rule to adjudicatory administrative hearings.15 Both cases were ad-
9. Following Mr. Justice Clark's dissent, the public misinterpreted Jencks as allow-
ing far broader rights of discovery than were actually contemplated by the decision.
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 680 (1958). The Court was severely criticized for assuming
an irresponsible attitude toward national security and allowing broad investigation of
confidential records. Id. at 681 (quoting criticisms).
10. 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
11. After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce
any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the
United States which relates to the subject matter . . . of the testimony of the
witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his
examination and use.
71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
12. If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such
statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court
shall excise the portions of such statements which do not relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness.
71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (Supp. V, 1958).
Unlike the other matters considered in the opinion, the problems connected with
governmental privilege in criminal suits had been well established prior to Jeneks.
See note 5 supra.
13. 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (Supp. V, 1958). Congress clearly
intended to deny the trial court power to dismiss the indictment against the accused.
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 697 (1958). As part of the legislative history, however, it
was pointed out that the section was not meant to remove the trial judge's inherent
right to dismiss an indictment if justice so requires. Schwartz 139; cf. 17 AM. JtM.
Dismissal § 64 (1957) ; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 349, 350 (1949) (collecting cases).
14. "The legislative history does not indicate the statute was applicable to admini-
strative hearings, immigration, naturalization and deportation cases or any other than
criminal trials." Schwartz 142.
15. A hearing before an administrative agency may be either rule-making or
adjudicatory. See Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11
(1952). An adjudicatory hearing is similar to a trial; the parties present evidence,
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versary proceedings. In both, the agency charged the defendant with a statu-
tory violation.' 0 Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Bd.,17 decided by the District of Columbia Circuit, concerned a
Subversive Activities Control Board hearing on the defendant's failure to
register as a "communist-action organization" under the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act.'8 In NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp.,' 9 a Second Circuit
case, the defendant-employer was accused of committing unfair labor practices
under the National Labor Relations Act.20 Relying on Jencks, both courts
held that the defendant was entitled to inspect prior statements of witnesses
which contained material relevant to their testimony.21 Neither, however, was
obliged to consider the related Jencks issues of the effect of governmental
privilege and the most proper method of dealing with a refusal to produce
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, before a tribunal which makes determinations
of fact and law. A rule-making hearing is similar to an appellate argument; the parties
present nonfactual disputes concerning law and policy. 1 DAvis, ADIYSTRATmvn LAW
§ 7.01 (1958). This Note will use the word "adversary" to denote a hearing in which
the Government seeks to enforce or enjoin the infringement of federal statutes and
regulations.
16. Cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 118 N.L:R.B. 1280, 1283 (1-957) (dissenting
opinion); Storey, The Second Hoover Commission: Its Legal Tak Force, 40 A.B.A.J.
483, 538 (1954). Such hearings are, in effect, administrative trials.
17. 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This is the second review of the Board's de-
terminations. The Board's original findings were upheld by the Court of Appeals, which
was reversed by the Supreme Court. See Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd. [SACB], 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), re''d, 351
U.S. 115 (1956). Neither of these opinions concerned the applicability of the Jencks
Rule.
18. 64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792 (1952). The act provides that any
organization in the United States (other than accredited representatives of foreign
governments) is a Communist-action organization if it is substantially directed, dominated,
or controlled by the world Communist movement, or operates primarily to advance the
objectives of this movement. 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(3). The Subversive
Activities Control Board held a hearing, pursuant to 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 792 (1952), on the charge of the Attorney General that the defendant was such an
organization and must register as such. 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1952).
19. 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
20. The defendant was charged with violating National Labor Relations Act §§
8(a) (1), (2), (3), (5), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (1),
(2), (3), (5) (1952). This proceeding was instituted pursuant to § 10 of the act.
The court's ruling that the Jencks Rule applies to NLRB proceedings was subse-
quently accepted by the Board. See Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1958);
NLRB Rules & Regulations (ser. 7), 29 C.F.R. § 102.95 (Supp. 1959).
21. The Communist Party court grounded its decision on the premise that failure to
compel production of the witnesses' relevant statements would create an illogical disparity
between the rules governing criminal, civil, and administrative adjudications. Citing
FED. R. Cirv. P. 34, Jencks, and' the Jenwks legislation, the court noted that if the
principle action were a civil suit or a criminal case, the Communist Party would have
been entitled to inspect the FBI reports it requested. Therefore, the court continued,
production of these reports must be considered within the "fundamentals of fair play"
required in an administrative proceeding. 254 F.2d at 328. This conclusion was sup-
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required information. In Communist Party, the Attorney General did not
claim privilege. And while privilege was asserted in Adhesive,22 the court
denied its existence.23 Thus these cases do not speak to the question of
ported by the opinion in Jencks, which, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, was
based on the elementary proposition that the interest of the United States is that justice
be done. Ibid.
The Adhesive court applied the Jencks rule with little discussion, simply relying on
the Supreme Court opinion and the Communist Party case. 258 F.2d at 407-0S.
Subsequently to this decision the D.C. Circuit followed its opinion in the Communist
Party case and applied the Jencks Rule to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
See Carlisle v. Rogers, 262 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
22. 258 F.2d at 407. The claim in Adhesive was based on a housekeeping statute. See
note 23 infra. Such claims are much more lightly regarded than formal claims that the
requested material contains state or military secrets. Compare United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp.
939 (Ct. Cl. 1958), and Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp.
551 (D. Md. 1956), with cases cited in note 23 infra. See also United States v. General
Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942) ; United States v. Cotton Valley Operators
Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940
(1953) (rejecting the argument that public policy requires that information of a house-
keeping character be classified within the category of state secrets).
A claim of privilege for state or military secrets is based on the premise that dis-
closure of the information in question would be prejudicial to the national interest. The
Government is not to invoke its privilege lightly. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1, 7 (1953). Moreover, if the claim is to be made, the Government must comply with
certain requirements. "There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head
of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration
by that officer." Id. at 7-8; accord, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D.
224, 230 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See generally 4 Moolx, FmERAL PRACTICE ff 26.25 (2d ed.
1950) ; 8 WiGmoRE, EVlDENCE §§ 2367-79 (3d ed. 1940); Carrow, Governmental Non-
disclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 166 (1958) ; Sanford, Evidentiary
Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Departments,
3 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1949); Note, 41 Coiq. L.Q. 737 (1956).
23. 258 F.2d at 407. The trial examiner ruled that Adhesive's counsel could not
inspect a statement given by the witness to the NLRB, a copy of which he possessed at
the hearing. The examiner relied on an NLRB regulation stating that,
. . . all files, documents, reports, memoranda and records pertaining to the in-
vestigation or disposition of charges . . . , and all matters of evidence obtained
by the Board or any of its agents in the course of investigation . . . , whether
in the regional offices of the Board or in its principal office in the District of
Columbia, are for good cause found by the Board to be confidential and are not
• . . available to public inspection unless permitted by the Board ....
NLRB Rules and Regulations (ser. 6), 29 C.F.R. § 102.86(b) (Supp. 1958). The
Second Circuit found that the statement was not "confidential" since it was in the
possession of the witness, not in the regional offices of the Board or in its principle
office in the District of Columbia.
Adhesive had not complied with the NLRB's procedural requirement of requesting
the NLRB to have its attorney produce the desired document. 258 F.2d at 406; NLRB
Rules and Regulations (ser. 6), 29 C.F.R. § 102.87 (Supp. 1958). If Adhesive had
complied, the court would not have had to rely on the definition of "confidential," but
could have grounded its decision on the settled principle that when the Government brings
suit in exercise of its general regulatory powers, it cannot invoke its housekeeping
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whether a valid governmental privilege would create an exception to an
administrative law Jencks Rule. Furthermore, both decisions are silent on
whether governmental refusal to conform to an agency order for production
should result in exclusion of the witness' testimony from consideration (the
equivalent of striking the testimony in a jury trial), dismissal of the action
without prejudice (the equivalent of declaring a mistrial), or dismissal of the
case with prejudice.
24
Applying the Jencks Rule to adjudicatory proceedings appears clearly
directed by Jencks itself. While the Supreme Court decision was written in
terms of the "administration of criminal justice,"25 its broad basis gives every
indication that the rule there propounded was meant to be followed in other
areas. 2  The Jencks Rule was designed to ensure "justice." 27 Without it a
defendant is deprived of information which may be otherwise unavailable-
information which might exonerate him, or which might provide the content
of an effective cross-examination. By articulating the Jencks Rule in terms
of justice, the Court invited its incorporation into the "fundamentals of fair
play" which traditionally govern administrative proceedings. 28
Further, absent a claim of governmental privilege for state secrets, no
possible justification exists for denying production of a witness' prehearing
statements. 29 The Jencks Rule would not interfere with the administrative
regulations. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224,229 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) ; Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor
Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) ; Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941) ;
cf. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948), rev'd on other grounds
sub nora. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
967 (1950) (government defendant) ; Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) (same).
24. Neither court reached these questions as the cases on appeal did not involve
governmental noncompliance with orders of the trial examiner, but rather with erroneous
rulings by them in the Government's favor.
25. 353 U.S. at 668.
26. "The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Jencks case . . . is based upon the
elementary proposition that the interest of the United States is that justice be done."
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314,
328 (D.C. Cir. 1958); accord, NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403, 408 (2d
Cir. 1958); see Note, The Aftermath of the leucks Case, 21 STAN. L. REV. 297, 329
(1959) (Jencks Rule necessary corollary of governing principle of Administrative Pro-
cedure Act).
27. " . . . [T]he defense must initially be entitled to see them [witnesses' statements]
to determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less." 353 U.S. at 669.
"'For the interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution . . . is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done .... '" Id. at 668 (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
28. In Communist Party, the court stated: "The question here is whether production
is one of the fundamentals of fair play required in an administrative proceeding. We
think it is." 254 F.2d at 327 & n.19; see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143 (1940).
29. See NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1958).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
agency's interest in keeping an informer's identity confidential,30 since the
rule refers only to the statements of informers who testify at hearings 1
Similarly, the rule would not force government counsel to reveal his "work
product" to the defendant.32 The possibility that statements taken by govern-
ment attorneys could expose their own thought processes would be avoided
if the trial examiner deleted or reworded appropriate portions of the state-
ment.3 3 Such a procedure would be particularly feasible under the Jencks
30. The Government is privileged to conceal the identity of its informers. Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1957) ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254
(1938); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); 8 WiGmaoE, EvmzxcE § 2374 (3d ed.
1940) ; cf. Committee on Pleadings, President's Conference on Administrative Procedure,
Report, 14 FED. Comsp. BJ. 99, 103 (1955) (remarks by Mr. Funston).
If the informer privilege works undue hardship on the defendant, the Government
may have to yield to discovery. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 10 F.R.D. 487
(N.D. Ohio 1950) (dictum). If the privilege causes the defendant disadvantages at
trial, the court "may require a continuance after the government's evidence has been
presented in order to allow the defendant time to marshal whatever appropriate evi-
dence it desires to offer." United States v. Sun Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 448, 451 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
31. Nevada Telecasting Corp., 16 RADIo REG. 220 (1957), involved a revocation pro-
ceeding by the FCC in which Nevada Telecasting requested prehearing discovery of
statements taken by an FCC investigating team. The hearing examiner denied the re-
quest because of the informer privilege. The Commission, in affirming, stated that the
Jencks Rule, if applicable to FCC proceedings, would only apply once the hearing com-
menced. This view of the Jencks case has also been taken in criminal cases. Newalk v.
United States, 254 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp.
878 (W.D. Mo. 1957). Cdntra, United States v. Hall, 153 F.Supp. 661 (W.D. Ky. 1957),
criticized in Schwartz 125-26. The Jencks legislation, supra notes 10-11, also takes this
view.
32. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his
legal theories and plan his strategy .... This work is reflected ... in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal be-
liefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly
termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the "work product of the
lawyer."
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947), affirminng 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945).
The Supreme Court there held a party could not use pretrial discovery techniques,
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, without a showing that production is essential to the preparation
of his case. 329 U.S. at 511.
Some authorities, however, limit Hickman v. Taylor to cases where the depositions
were obtained by an attorney. Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C.
1948); Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); DeBruce v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 4 MooRn, FEDERAL PRAcricF ff
2623 [8], at 1132 (1950). But see Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). So interpreted, Hickman is not always applicable
to adversary administrative proceedings since statements of witnesses are often taken by
agency employees other than trial counsel. For example, in Adhesive, the statements were
taken by an NLRB investigator, 258 F.2d at 407, and in Communist Party they were
taken by the FBI, 254 F.2d at 320.
33. This practice was followed by the trial court in Hickman v. Taylor in an in
camera proceeding. 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other gr-ounds, 153 F.2d 212
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Rule. The examiner would often be required to inspect the statements for
the purpose of excluding irrelevant material.2 4 Further, even if the govern-
ment counsel's work product was revealed, the evil, if there is one, of such
disclosure is insignificant once the hearing has started. 5 In any event, by
the hearing stage, the need for ascertaining the truth seemingly outweighs
any harm resulting from work-product disclosure.2 6
Application of the Jencks Rule becomes somewhat questionable, however,
when the objective of full cross-examination is balanced against a governmental
claim that a witness' statement contains information which, in the public
interest, should not be disclosed. 7 Nevertheless, a logical extension of the
principles announced in the Jencks decision indicates that the Jencks Rule
should prevail over claims of governmental privilege in adversary adjudi-
catory administrative hearings just as it does in criminal cases.2 8 In rejecting
(3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), discussed in 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACricE
ff 26.23[5], at 1121 (2d ed. 1950) ; Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 687 n.47 & accompanying
text (1958).
34. The Jencks legislation provides that in criminal cases, the court is to determine
relevancy. See notes 10, 12 supra. This does not necessarily alter Jencks. One commenta-
tor has argued that the defendant or his attorney would determine relevancy under
.Tencks. Schwartz 137. Another has maintained that the Supreme Court opinion indi-
cated that the Government should determine the issue of relevancy. Comment, 67 YALE
L.J. 674, 678, 687 (1958). But cf. id. at 688 n.49. These interpretations are dubious. The
Court's standard of relevancy would be meaningless if the defendant was to inspect the
very documents which were to be denied him upon his determination of their irrele-
vancy. On the other hand, if the Government determined relevancy, the defendant might
not obtain the statements the rule is designed to give him.
35. After a hearing has started, the agency counsel's plan of attack and legal theories
may well be exposed to the defense counsel. Moreover, once the witness has given direct
testimony, statements of the witness may contain little in the way of "work product"
which has not already been revealed.
Although the "work product" doctrine was formulated in a civil case, it would seem
applicable to administrative hearings which are basically adversary. See note 15 supra.
The policy reasons behind Hickman are based on the adversary process. 329 U.S. at
510-11.
36. The Supreme Court intimated as much in Hickman when it said that, 'We do
not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's
counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases.
Where relevant . .. facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of
those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had.
Such written statements and documents might .. .be useful for purposes of impeach-
ment or corroboration." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
37. The Government might raise claims of privilege in administrative proceedings for
many reasons. For example, the Government might claim privilege for military secrets in
proceedings before such agencies as the CAB and AEC. It might claim privilege as to its
intraoffice memoranda in any agency proceeding. The Court of Claims recently upheld the
claim of the General Services Administrator that production of an advisory opinion on
intraoffice policy in relation to sales to the plaintiff was contrary to the public interest.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. 'Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl..1958). It is
also conceivable that the Attorney General in SACB proceedings would not want to
reveal material containing information as to the whereabouts of FBI agents.
38. See text at notes 25-28 supra.
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the claim of governmental privilege advanced in Jencks, the Court noted
"the holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that in criminal
causes ' . . . the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at
the price of letting the defendant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases
is that since the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty
to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prose-
cution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of
anything which might be material to his defense .... ,-
This rationale, although formulated in criminal cases, seems to emphasize
the Government's role as moving party, rather than the nature of the action
involved. And if this is the proper emphasis, governmental privilege should
be no more valid an exception to the Jencks Rule in an administrative hearing
than it is in a criminal case. An interpretation of the Jencks-Second Circuit
rationale as holding that the Government's position as plaintiff or defendant
determines the weight given to a claim of privilege is inferentially supported
by previous decisions in civil cases.40 In United States v. Reynolds,4' the
39. 353 U.S. at 670-71. The Second Circuit cases cited by the Court were United
States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolschek, 142
F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
40. The courts have generally held that when the Government brings suit, it waives
its right to withhold information under housekeeping statutes. Bowles v. Ackerman, 4
F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528
(N.D. Ill. 1942); Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941). The language
of these decisions indicates that the waiver could apply to claims based on grounds other
than housekeeping statutes. "It seems that when a party seeks relief in a court of law,
he must be held to have waived any privilege, which he otherwise might have had, to
withhold testimony required by the rules of pleading or evidence as a basis for such
relief." Fleming v. Bernardi, supra at 625. But cf. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp.
827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1948), reed on other grounds sub non. Alltmont v. United States,
177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). But the Government has
been denied the right to invoke its housekeeping regulations even in cases where the
Government was a defendant. Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948); O'Neill v. United States, supra; see Note, 41 CoRN. L.Q. 737, 742-43
(1956).
Another limitation upon the language quoted from Fleming is found in Republic of
China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956). Here a claim
of privilege for state secrets was upheld in a suit by the Government to collect on an
insurance policy. However, that case may be inconsistent with language in Reynolds v.
United States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), as well as Fleming. See notes 41-48 infra and accom-
panying text.
Note that the suggested interpretation does not hinge solely upon the Government's
appearance as party-plaintiff in the particular litigation. Thus when an individual begins
proceedings in order to prevent governmental action against him, the Government can
fairly be said to be the "moving party." See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (action by alien for declaratory relief against deportation order and for
injunction restraining arrest) ; cf. Further Note on, the Power of Congress To Limit
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, HART & WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEi 312, 318 (1953).
41. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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Supreme Court accepted a formal claim of governmental privilege for military
secrets in a tort action to which the United States was a defendant.42 The
Court emphasized that the action was based on the Federal Tort Claims
Act 43 which waives, to a degree, the Government's sovereign immunity from
suit.44 The Court reasoned that a suit which can be brought only with the
defendant's consent can be brought only on the defendant's terms. 45 In
distinguishing the Second Circuit cases cited in Jencks, the Reynolds Court
specifically noted that the rationale of those cases had "no application in a
civil forum where the Government is not the moving party .... 46
Thus the Court did not seek to limit the Second Circuit's rationale to
criminal cases by distinguishing Reynolds on the ground that it was a civil
case. Instead, the Court's reliance on the Government's limited consent to be
sued implied that whereas the Government's duty to "do justice" may be
lessened through the use of privilege when the United States is an otherwise
immune defendant, that duty is controlling when the Government is the
movant. Although there are no direct precedents accepting this interpreta-
tion of Reynolds, lower courts have stated in dicta that the United States
could not escape disclosure rules similar to Jencks by claiming governmental
privilege when the Government had instituted a civil suit.
47
42. Although Reynolds concerned military secrets, the case has been held applicable
to other confidential material as well. Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956) (diplomatic memoranda); Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (inter-departmental
memoranda).
In Reynolds, the Court emphasized that the respondents had "posed the privi-
lege question for decision with the formal claim of privilege set against a dubious show-
ing of necessity." 345 U.S. at 11. The Court further stated, however, that "even the
most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ulti-
mately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." Ibid.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
44. The act provides: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions
of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a pri-
vate individual under like circumstances .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it consents to be
sued. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Thompson, 98
U.S. 486 (1878) (dictum). In addition to the Tort Claims Act, the United States has per-
mitted suit in contract under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 791 (1952) ; and in admiral-
ty under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1952).
45. 345 U.S. at 12.
46. 345 U.S. at 12 & n.27.
47. In criminal cases prior to Jencks the rule was established that the Government
could not claim privilege without suffering dismissal of the indictment against the
accused. See United States v. Beekman, 155 F2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States
v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944); see text at note 5 supra. These cases
have been held applicable in civil suits involving privilege under a housekeeping statute.
Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Walling v. Twyeffort, 158
F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1947) (dictum); Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 22
F.R.D. 266, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
On the other hand, one base line court has accepted a claim of privilege
for state secrets in a civil action in which the United States was plaintiff.
4 8
This precedent, plus the absence of direct support for the plaintiff-defendant
distinction, leaves open the possibility that the Jencks-Second Circuit rationale
may be interpreted in a more restrictive manner. A court might hold that the
actual emphasis of the rationale is on criminal prosecution, not institution of
suit, and that consequently claims of governmental privilege should be allowed
in all civil cases. Such an interpretation would rest on the proposition that
the Government's duty to do justice is greater in criminal than in civil pro-
ceedings.4 9 And this proposition must, in turn, rest on the traditional distinc-
tion between criminal and civil cases. Thus, in the criminal cases, the Govern-
ment is seeking to redress a public wrong rather than to gain compensation for
an injury which could be termed "private." 50 Similarly, it might be argued,
48. See Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551
(D. Md. 1956). This case involved libels by the Republic of China and the United
States against defendant ship insurers to recover on marine and war risk policies for
vessels which the United States had sold to China and on which the United States held
maritime liens. The defendants served detailed interrogatories on the United States
which were answered with one exception concerning memoranda between the American
and British governments pertaining to the recognition of Communist China. Secretary of
State Dulles lodged a formal claim of privilege. The court in upholding the govern-
ment's claim placed emphasis on the fact that defendant's showing of necessity was
dubious. Cf. note 42 supra.
49. Compare text at note 39 supra.
50. The classification of state or federal action as private rather than public rests
on an analogy to the distinction between the exercise of "governmental" and "proprietary"
functions. A government is deemed to act in a proprietary capacity when it performs
functions which a private citizen could perform. PRossER, ToRTS 774 (2d ed. 1955).
This distinction is employed to determine whether the government's general immunity
from tort extends to specific activities; if the government is acting in a proprietary
capacity, no immunity exists. Ibid; 2 HARPER & JAmEs, ToRrs § 29.06 (1956). The
Government's suit to collect on an insurance policy, such as in Republic of China v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956), could be considered
private in nature. A civil suit under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. V, 1958), on the other
hand, might be deemed public in nature. It might be argued that when the government
sues to enforce a public law, it sues in its governmental capacity and should be more
interested in seeing that justice is done than in successfully prosecuting the particular
suit. When the government sues in its proprietary capacity however, as in a tort suit, its
primary interest, like that of any plaintiff in an adversary proceeding, is in winning.
Yet this argument suffers from two failings. First, the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions has been criticized as applied to suits against the
government because "no satisfactory test has been devised for distinguishing govern-
mental from proprietary functions." HARPER & JAmEs, op. cit. suepra at 1621-22;
Borchard, Government Liability i4 Tort, 34 YAIa L.J. 129 (1924). Second, the pro-
prietary-governmental distinction has evolved from governmental immunity and has
questionable applicability when the government is plaintiff. Further, when the govern-
ment sues in a private action, that suit can also be characterized as on behalf of the
people, to recompense them for damages to the public treasury. So viewed, the govern-
ment should be held to the same standard of doing justice as in other cases.
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a criminal defendant is subject to harsher sanctions and to a greater stigma
of moral culpability than a civil defendant. Even so, the Jencks-Second
Circuit doctrine would still apply to the type of administrative hearing in
which the Jencks Rule has been employed, for the adversary hearing more
clearly resembles the criminal prosecution than the civil suit.51 The Govern-
ment's counsel, as in criminal cases, is seeking action against accused violators
of public laws.52 In fact, the substantive offense considered in such a hearing
may also be a crime. 3 And while the sanction involved is somewhat less
,than criminal "punishment," the element of culpability attaching to the
offender may be as greatY4 Thus, in sum, it would seem that claims of
51. For example:
It cannot be contended that an unfair labor practice proceeding is "purely civil"
in nature. It is not litigation of the rights of private parties but it is a prosecu-
tion initiated by the General Counsel of the Board wherein he charges that
Respondent has violated certain provisions of the act and accordingly seeks certain
remedies. Though the Act is neither punitive nor compensatory but preventative
and remedial in its nature, it establishes a public procedure looking only to public
ends.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1285-86 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
52. See text at notes 18, 20 supra. Such proceedings are also instituted, for example,
by the Federal Trade Commission fo prevent unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V, 1958), by the Food
and Drug Administration to enforce the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1055
(1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1952) by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to expel aliens who illegally entered the country, 66 Stat. 173, 8 U.S.C. § 1103
(1952).
53. For example, the FTC is empowered to order parties to cease and desist from
disseminating false advertisements which will induce the purchase of food, drugs or
cosmetics. 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 UZS.C. §§ 52(a), 53 (1952). Such dissemination
is also a criminal offense, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 54 (1952), which may be
punished by fine or imprisonment. Moreover, criminal liability does not require mens
rca. Ibid.; Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1953); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC,
120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941) ; see United States v. 36 Bottles of London Dry Gin, 210
Fed. 271 (3d Cir. 1914). Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 301-03, 52 Stat.
1042 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 331-33 (1952), it is both a civil and criminal
offense to sell adulterated foods. Here too iensr rea is not a necessary element of
criminal liability. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1943). Selling
adulterated or impure food or drugs is also a crime under state law and, as in the
federal courts, may not require mens rea as a necessary element. City of New Orleans
v. Vinci, 153 La. 527, 96 So. 110 (1923); Commonwealth v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533,
36 N.E. 308 (1894); People v. Kimmel, 88 Misc. 38, 150 N.Y. Supp. 311 (App. T.
1914). See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUL L. Rxv. 55, 72-73
(1933). Similarly, an alien who procures admission into the United States by fraud is
subject to deportation. 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 12 51(c) (1952).
54. The line between criminal punishment and administrative action can be a narrow
one. For example, permanent proscription from government service on grounds of disloyalty
and Communist affiliations is punishment, see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946),
although proscription for three years on the same grounds has been held not to constitute
punishment, and no trial or jury is necessary under the sixth amendment, Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951)
(review of Civil Service Commission action). Judge Edgerton dissented vigorously. "For
her [Bailey's] supposed disloyal thoughts she has been punished by dismissal from a
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governmental privilege should not function as an exception to an administra-
tive law Jencks Rule, irrespective of whether the Jencks-Second Circuit ration-
ale is based on the institution of suit or on the nature of the action involved.
Unlike the question of the relationship between governmental privilege and
the Jencks Rule, the problem of the rule's implementation was considered by
both the Court and Congress. Jencks held that counsel's refusal to submit
the witness' statements should result in dismissal of the indictment against the
accused.5 5 The legislation, on the other hand, required the striking of the
witness' testimony or the declaration of a mistrial.56 Arguably, the con-
gressional solution may be more proper. The act apparently aimed for a
result similar to that of an effective cross-examination: nullification of the
witness' testimony. 7 The statute's sanctions could readily be applied to an
administrative law Jencks Rule with only slight modification. An administra-
tive equivalent of the mistrial would not be needed since juries are not involved
in administrative hearings. 58 Rather, the trial examiner could, in effect, strike
the witness' testimony by refusing to consider it in arriving at his decision.
The sanctions imposed by the legislation in criminal cases should not be
incorporated into an administrative law Jencks Rule, however, since the
statute overlooks important aspects of Jencks-granted rights. The function of
cross-examination cannot be completely fulfilled by extirpation of the witness'
testimony. On cross-examination, a witness' view of events may not only
be discredited, but testimony may be elicited which indicates that the facts
were actually other than those indicated by his original testimony. Further-
more, the requested statement is not an end in itself. It may provide leads to
other information which might be useful in cross-examination. A statement
by a witness which the prosecution conceals may well be of extreme import-
ance.59 This likelihood is increased when the prosecutor prefers to have the
witness' testimony at trial expunged rather than permit the statement to be
used on cross-examination.69 In such a situation, the denial of the defendant's
wholly nonsensitive position in which her efficiency rating was high. The case received
nation-wide publicity. Ostracism inevitably followed. A finding of disloyalty is closely akin
to a finding of treason. The public hardly distinguished between the two." Id. at 66. See
also Greene v. Wilson, 150 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1957); Korematsu v. United States,
319 U.S. 432 (1943).
55. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
57. Cf. Schwartz 138 & n.146.
58. 2 DAvis, ADMINIsTRAv LA, § 14.08 (1958); 1 id. § 8.16; see United States
v. Aderman, 209 F2d 777 (7th Cir. 1954); Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal
Cases, 2 ViI.. L. Rzv. 293, 348 (1957).
59. Both Jencks and the pre-Jenwks cases which penalized noncompliance with an
order to produce a witness' statement by dismissal noted the importance of the witness'
testimony. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 677 (1957) ; United States v. Grayson,
166 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 582, 584 (2d
Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2nd Cir. 1944).
60. See Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 698 (1958). Another reason for the prosecutor's
refusal to permit the defendant to inspect witnesses' statements is that the statements
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right to use the statement for cross-examination purposes is inconsistent with
the principle emphasized by the Jencks Court when it denied the Government's
claim of privilege. To permit the Government to restrict cross-examination
of a party having knowledge of crucial events is to allow the Government first
to undertake prosecution and then to deprive the accused of matter which
might be material to his defense-action termed "unconscionable" in Jencks.61
Since these principles are equally applicable to adversary adjudicatory ad-
ministrative hearings, the Jencks sanction should be employed therein. Failure
to comply with an examiner's order to produce relevant, prior statements
of a witness should result in dismissal with prejudice, rather than the striking
of the witness' testimony. Limiting this remedy to the statements of crucial
witnesses would prevent the Government from having to give up a case which
could be won on other evidence.62 Admittedly, this would be inconsistent
with the Jencks legislation as presently employed in criminal cases.63 Yet,
since the legislation does not contemplate administrative hearings, no such
consistency is necessary. If, on the other hand, the congressional modifica-
tion of the Jencks remedy was meant to apply to agency proceedings, explicit
legislation could easily be enacted.
may contain information which would reveal the Government's plans for future related
litigation, or state secrets.
61. See 353 U.S. at 670-71.
62. Such was the worry of Congress. Schwartz 138 (citing Congressional debates);
cf. Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 697-98. The Supreme Court's sanction in Jencks was
not adopted because Congress found that dismissal would unduly impair law enforcement,
and felt that declaration of a mistrial gave the prosecution a right of appeal which
would not exist if the charges were dismissed. Ibid.; Schwartz 138. It is not dear
whether a mistrial is appealable or a dismissal of an indictment is not appealable.
Compare Comment, 67 YA.E L.J. 674, 689-99 (1958), with Schwartz 138-39.
63. Note, 57 MicH. L. Rav. 420, 422 (1959).
